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Tactical Generalship:
A View from the Past and a Look Toward the 21st Century

by

Major Michael W. Everett
Armor

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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<p>Tactical generalship is an obscure and often misunderstood concept. It is mistakenly thought of as being synonymous with senior level leadership of general officers. However, in wartime, our general officers are evaluated on their generalship more so than their leadership. Why do historians make the distinction between generalship and leadership? The phenomenon of tactical generalship has to be something other than pure leadership. The purpose of this study is to examine that phenomenon.</p> <p>This study uses a historical analysis of the tactical operations of US Ulysses S. Grant and the Erwin Rommel. Specifically, it addresses Grant's operations at Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, and Rommel's operations in the Battle of France in May-June 1940. Tactical generalship is defined as an art in a state of war. Eight qualities of tactical general-</p>				
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ship are defined and discussed, using Grant and Rommel as examples. These qualities are separated into three categories--cognitive, temperamental, and moral domain. The essence of tactical generalship is also examined within the context of their operations.

The conclusions drawn from this study indicate a need to inculcate the essence of tactical generalship into senior level leadership training. Future leaders must know that tactical generalship is an art based on years of study and experience. Furthermore, the demands of future wars will be much greater than previous wars because of nuclear weapons and technology. Future must exercise their art well and be cognizant of the eight qualities of tactical generalship to cope with the rigors of 21st century warfare.

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Name of Student: Michael W. Everett, Armor

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Approved by:

Robert M. Epstein Monograph Director
(Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D.)

Richard Hart Sinnreich Director, School of
(Col. Richard Hart Sinnreich, MA) Advanced Military Studies

Philip J. Brooks Director, Graduate Degree
(Philip J. Brooks, Ph.D.) Programs

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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL GENERALSHIP: A VIEW FROM THE PAST AND A LOOK TOWARD THE 21ST CENTURY, by Major Michael W. Everett, USA, 44 pages.

Tactical generalship is an obscure and often misunderstood concept. It is mistakenly thought of as being synonymous with senior level leadership of general officers. However, in wartime, our general officers are evaluated on their generalship more so than their leadership. Why do historians make the distinction between leadership and generalship? The phenomenon of tactical generalship has to be something other than pure leadership. The purpose of this study is to examine that phenomenon.

This study uses a historical analysis of the tactical operations of BG Ulysses S. Grant and MG Erwin Rommel. Specifically, it addresses Grant's operations at Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862, and Rommel's operations in the Battle of France in May-June 1940. Tactical generalship is defined as an art conducted in a state of war. Eight qualities of tactical generalship are defined and discussed, using Grant and Rommel as examples. These qualities are separated into three categories--cognitive, temperamental, and moral domain. The essence of tactical generalship is also examined within the context of their operations.

The conclusions drawn from this study indicate a need to inculcate the essence of tactical generalship into senior level leadership training. Future leaders must know that tactical generalship is an art based on years of study and experience. Furthermore, the demands of future wars will be much greater than previous wars because of nuclear weapons and technology. Future tactical generals must exercise their art well and be cognizant of the eight qualities of tactical generalship to cope with the rigors of 21st century warfare.

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INTRODUCTION

THE NEED TO UNDERSTAND GENERALSHIP

"Generalship was obstinate, criminally stupid, ridiculously rigid, almost totally unenterprising, pathetically feeble, and absolutely inhuman. It is only charitable to concede that the generals had to do their best in a type of warfare into which they were forced and of which they had no personal experience. The lessons of 1914-18 were sharp ones, and later leaders profited by them and, indeed, are still profiting." 1

Generalship is an obscure and often misunderstood art of general officers. The term is not defined in modern US military manuals, nor is there a doctrinal distinction between generalship and senior level leadership. The US Army does a plausible job teaching junior and mid-level leadership (FM 22-100) and is currently developing a doctrine for senior level leadership (FM 22-999). Yet in wartime, we evaluate and scrutinize general officers for generalship more than leadership. Generals Eisenhower, Bradley, Patton, MacArthur, and others profited by the errors of World War I, and are remembered primarily for their generalship manifested during World War II and far less for their leadership displayed in other functions unrelated to the conduct of war itself.

Common dictionary definitions offer broad and shallow concepts of generalship. Some examples are:

"1: office or tenure of office of a general: exercise of the functions of a general 2: military skill in a general officer or high commander 3: LEADERSHIP, MANAGEMENT" 2

"1.a. The functions of a general (obs.). b. The discharge of those functions; conduct in command...2. The office or dignity of a general...b. The tenure of the office of general...3. The distinctive qualities of a general; skill in the command and management of an Army; strategy." 3

"1. The rank, office, or tenure of a general. 2. Leadership or skill in the conduct of war. 3. Skillful management or leadership." 4

These definitions give the impression that any officer who attains the rank of general and functions in that capacity practices generalship. An additional prerequisite is the ability to be skillful in management and leadership. Both abilities are extremely important for peacetime operations and can be emulated by any officer within the military system. However, in wartime, the character of a general must undergo a rapid metamorphosis, "...because the qualities that enter into the exercise of generalship in action have the power, in a very condensed period of time to determine the life and death of thousands, and sometimes the fate of nations." ⁵ In this context, generalship extends beyond scientific leadership, management norms and abilities. It seeks to reckon with political and military conundrums, unknown variables such as chance, friction, time, and weather, while simultaneously deceiving an opposing mind that seeks to frustrate and disturb a general's plans and operations.

To manifest the art of generalship, the condition of war must exist. Considering this fine distinction, studies on generalship are few, because the phenomenon of the peacetime-wartime metamorphosis described above is not universally taught or understood very well in peacetime. James Dunnigan expands this point by cautioning,

"Many of the most incompetent wartime leaders have been highly regarded peacetime military leaders...You can prepare for war, but you can't actually practice the real thing...Peacetime military leaders spend most of their efforts convincing everyone that their services are adequate for wartime needs...Even in the most experienced armies a large proportion, sometimes even 50 percent or more, of the leaders will prove incompetent in wartime...Military institutions have a difficult time cultivating effective wartime leadership [generalship] in peacetime. the ability to create such superior leadership is largely the result of military traditions, social attitudes toward the military and (a rare occurrence in itself) a truly outstanding leader at the head of the armed forces. Most of the time military leadership is mediocre. There are many good and compelling reasons for this, but the leaders [generals] are still mediocre, and we all suffer accordingly in time of war." 6

In the 21st century, the US armed forces cannot afford to have 50 percent or more of its general officers incompetent in wartime. Given the emergence of new force structures, increased ranges and lethality of nascent weapon systems, along with current Threat forces and insurgent activities in developing countries, the US Army cannot afford to have mediocre generals in command of its units and expect to win any future conflict. It is imperative that general officers be prepared to transition immediately into a wartime posture upon the initiation of hostilities. Competent generalship will foster superb leadership, considered the most essential element of combat power, when synchronized with maneuver, firepower, and protection.

The purpose of this study is to define generalship in the context of modern warfare. More specifically, tactical generalship will be defined and discussed in detail, using Generals Ulysses S. Grant and Erwin Rommel as examples. These men were chosen because they exemplified the essence of tactical generalship. They commanded during the period which some historians describe as the "age of technological change," in which developments in ballistics, electronics, mechanization, and metallurgy surged with the changes and improvements of industrialization. Grant commanded during the emergence of this era and provides some keen insights about generalship. His operations at Forts Henry and Donelson will be examined. Rommel commanded during the apex of this period and epitomized tactical generalship during the Battle of France in 1940. Finally, both men demonstrated common qualities of tactical generalship that future generals can and must emulate. These qualities have survived the test of time and are essential for success. As General Sir Archibald Wavell aptly wrote, "A general may succeed for some time in persuading his superi-

ors that he is a good commander: he will never persuade his army that he is a good commander unless he has the real qualities of one."⁷

GENERALSHIP DEFINED

"Expenditure of military force is an art, and like all other arts it is based on science. The science of war is the knowledge of human conflict in all its forms, whether the battle is between two men, or between two or more nations." 8

Generalship is the art, exercised by general officers commanding large military forces, of attaining political/military aims through the conduct of war. Additionally, it is the deployment of armed forces in a conflict, to achieve a political end. To understand this concept and subsequently tactical generalship, it is necessary to study the four key elements of the definition. First generalship is an art because it relates to the employment of vast numbers of human beings manning weapon systems, applying certain principles of war, handling unknown variables, and frustrating the intentions of an opposing commander. Secondly, general officers commanding separate brigades and larger units will apply this art at their respective levels (strategic, operational, or tactical).⁹ Thirdly, depending on the level of war, generals must achieve military objectives in order to attain political/military aims. Since "war is never an isolated act,"¹⁰ the general must be knowledgeable of the political object or motive of his government and the military aims of his higher commanders. Through this understanding, the general recognizes that he is an instrument by which his government achieves its political object. Lastly, the conduct of war is the essential element of the definition. Politics is the catalyst which triggers a state of war or conflict. Consequently, the condition of low, mid, or high intensity conflict must exist before the general can exercise his art.

Tactical generalship is the art of achieving military aims by

defeating or destroying an opposing military force through the conduct of engagements and battles. There are also four components to this concept which must be studied in depth. The term tactical addresses how combat operations are planned and executed. The operational general decides when and where the battle will take place. The tactical general then applies tactics and techniques within his area of operations to conduct engagements and battles. In doing so, he produces the most effective combat power at the decisive point on the battlefield. TM 20-205, Dictionary of US Army Terms, dated January 1944, defines tactics and techniques as the,

"...art and science of planning and carrying out the movement of troops in action or in the presence of the enemy, so as to use combat power most effectively against the enemy, together with skill in the use of personnel, weapons, and equipment by individuals and units for the most effective combat against the enemy...The phrase tactics and techniques is often used to refer to the general and detailed methods used by commanders and forces in carrying out their assignments." 11

The essence of tactical generalship is twofold: a) the actions the general pursues while anticipating contact with the enemy, and b) actions taken once contact has been made. Additionally, the tactical general must comprehend his role in the battle and understand the intentions of his higher commanders. In doing so, he executes his mission in accordance with the aims directed by the campaign or major operational plan.

The means by which the general achieves military aims are through the disruption, destruction, and defeat of those tactical units opposing him in his area of operation. Also, those units that possess the capability of affecting friendly forces and future operations must be influenced in such a way that they will be neutralized and defeated in forthcoming actions. Therefore, the general must be able to visualize beyond his immediate situation and foresee

developments laterally and in depth simultaneously. While he is accomplishing these tasks, he continually analyzes his situation, transforms his vision into intent, and subsequently communicates his intent to subordinate commanders.

Finally, the tactical general exercises tactics and techniques to achieve military aims by conducting engagements and battles.

"Engagements mean fighting. The object of fighting is the destruction or defeat of the enemy...Every engagement is a bloody and destructive test of physical and moral strength. Whoever has the greater sum of both left at the end is the victor." ¹² In the modern perspective, engagements are small conflicts between divisions and smaller units. The duration of these engagements may last for some hours. Engagements may or may not lead to battle, but a series of related engagements may comprise a battle.

Modern battle is the most intense military action. It involves the main forces of opposing divisions, corps, and armies, in successive and simultaneous engagements. A battle may last a few days to several months. The outcome of the battle could affect certain phases of a campaign or the campaign itself. The spatial dimensions of the battlefield will vary from small areas such as Forts Henry and Donelson to the extended frontages seen in the Battle of France in 1940.

Sound tactical generalship can produce total victory from engagements and battles. "If in conclusion we consider the total concept of victory, we find that it consists of three elements:

1. The enemy's greater loss of material strength.
2. His loss of morale.
3. His open admission of the above by giving up his intentions." ¹³

All three elements must occur to accomplish victory in combat. The commanding general resolves to impose these elements on his foe, executes his plans, and ultimately recognizes the alteration of the enemy's intentions. To accomplish these tasks requires individuals possessing certain qualities that are lacking in ordinary, mediocre, or incompetent generals.

QUALITIES OF TACTICAL GENERALSHIP

"The impulse to fight a great battle, the unhampered instinctive movement toward it, must emanate from a sense of one's own powers and the absolute conviction of necessity..." 14

Several treatises, from antiquity to modern times have been written on the qualities of generalship. For the purpose of this study, these thoughts were collated and refined to focus on tactical generalship. A variety of ideas exists regarding the qualities of
15
generals. There are essential qualities that consistently appear through all ages. To establish a basis for understanding tactical generalship, these qualities are grouped into three major categories: 1) cognitive qualities, 2) temperamental qualities, and 3) moral qualities. These categories are interdependent and not mutually exclusive.

Cognitive qualities are those that relate to awareness based on empirical and factual knowledge. They focus on the enemy and the conduct of battles and engagements. They are ingrained in the general through years of study, experience, and a complete consciousness of the dynamics of warfare. The tactical general will face a myriad of situations and should expect to accomplish missions under stressful conditions. In order to maintain his perspective and to continue to focus on his main effort, it is critical that the general have a keen awareness of the current situation. Thus, cognitive qualities are those related to intellectual astuteness, creativity based on intelligence, and coup d'oeil, an immeasurable sixth sense which allows the general to feel the terrain and current environment.

Intellectual astuteness involves dimensions of mental acumen. It includes knowledge, common sense, reasoning, plus penetrating the mind of the opposing commander. Knowledge is gained from study

and experience. Common sense and reasoning enable the general to make sound decisions based on good judgment. "War is the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth." ¹⁶ While the general is searching for truth, he must also infiltrate the mind of his opponent to achieve total victory. "It is to be ignorant and blind...in the science of commanding armies to think that a general has anything more important to do than to apply himself to learning the inclinations and character of his adversary." ¹⁷ This observation was made of Hannibal in the second century BC. Maurice de Saxe later upheld this observation almost 2000 years later by saying the general,

"...should be able to penetrate the minds of other men, while remaining impenetrable himself. He should be endowed with the capacity of being prepared for everything, with activity accompanied by judgment, with skill to make a proper decision on all occasions, and with the exactness of discernment." ¹⁸

Creativity involves intellectual improvisation. It is the ability of the general to keep his opponent off balance. He does this by destroying the enemy's center of gravity and defeating his forces at the decisive points. "The greatest talent of a general, and the surest hope of success, lie in some degree in the good choice of these points." ¹⁹ The general's creativity enables him to see decisive points prior to the battle. This allows him to emasculate his opponent's intent throughout the fight. J.F.C. Fuller vividly states,

"Originality, not conventionality, is one of the main pillars of generalship. To do something that the enemy does not expect, is not prepared for, something which will surprise him and disarm him morally. To always be thinking ahead...To spy out the soul of one's adversary, and to act in a manner which will astonish and bewilder him...To render the enemy's general ridiculous in the eyes of his men, this is the foundation of success." ²⁰

Coup d'oeil (glance of the eye) "...merely refers to the quick recognition of a truth that the mind would ordinarily miss, or would perceive only after long study and reflection."²¹ Essentially, coup d'oeil fuses the qualities of intellect and creativity, sifts through the uncertainties and friction of war, then allows the general to comprehend the terrain and enemy disposition with precision and accuracy. It is the most essential quality in the cognitive category. This is apparent because it permits the tactical general to maintain his freedom of action, to dominate events on the battlefield, while at the same time avoiding the adverse influences of his adversary.

Temperamental qualities are attributable to the distinctive character and personality of the general. Because of their active nature, and because subordinates can easily observe and emulate them, they are discussed more often than the other qualities. These qualities relate to the acts of fighting and killing during the course of an engagement and battle. **Courage, fortitude, and boldness** comprise the temperamental qualities.

Clausewitz teaches that there are two kinds of courage. The first is the contempt of danger in the wake of combat. This is manifested in two forms. The first is a permanent form, which is a continuously displayed indifference to the dangers of war. The temporary form manifests sporadic acts of boldness, intrepidity, enthusiasm, or patriotism. Basically, "these two kinds [forms] of courage act in different ways. The first is the more dependable; having become second nature [from experience], it will never fail. The other will often achieve more. There is more reliability in the first kind, more boldness in the second. The first leaves the mind

calmer; the second tends to stimulate, but it can also be blind.

The highest kind of courage is a compound of both."²²

The second kind of courage is the general's acceptance of responsibility for his actions. This responsibility is inherent in his rank and position. He is accountable for all that he achieves or fails to accomplish. He should be aware of this accountability, not only to his higher commanders but also to the country he serves.

Fortitude involves resolute perseverance and firmness of mind under stressful conditions. This quality is evinced by the general's will to destroy the opposing enemy force, his **determination** to win, and his **presence of mind** to see events as they are amidst chaos and confusion. "A man is not born a commander. He must become one. Not to be anxious; to be always cool; to avoid confusion in his commands; never to change countenance; to give his orders in the midst of battle with as much composure as if he were perfectly at ease."²³

Napoleon also reflected, "the first qualification in a general is a cool head- that is, a head which receives accurate impressions, and estimates things and objects at their real value. He must not allow himself to be elated by good news, nor depressed by bad."²⁴ Fortitude allows the general to draw upon his courage, be firm once a decision is made, yet flexible when conditions change.

Boldness comes from a combination of creativity and intelligence. This combination is translated into aggressive action at decisive moments. It is action based on calculated risks in planning and execution, or action necessitated by dire situations. It can disrupt, confuse, and bewilder an enemy force. In many instances, acts of boldness have secured victory from the throes of defeat. Clausewitz encourages boldness at all levels, but cautions, "...when bold-

ness rebels against obedience, when it defiantly ignores an expressed command, must it be treated as a dangerous offense; then it must be prevented not for its innate qualities, but because an order has been²⁵ disobeyed, and in war obedience is of cardinal importance."

The final category concerns moral qualities-- those qualities that make the general fight in the first place, continue to fight in the face of mental and physical exertion, and ultimately sustain the expectations of soldiers with victories. The first quality is **fitness**, more specifically, "...the quality of robustness, the²⁶ ability to stand the shocks of war." The tactical general must be physically fit and in good health throughout the battle. Conditioning harbors the mind from stress, enhances creativity, and helps the commander to focus through the uncertainties of battle. Baron von der Goltz points out that this quality is invaluable because "in a sick body, the mind cannot possibly remain permanently fresh and clear. It is stunted by the selfish body from the great things to²⁷ which it should be entirely devoted."

Finally, there is an inherent quality of command at the tactical level sagaciously regarded as a function of commandership, duty, and responsibility. In some ways it is intrinsically related to the second kind of courage previously discussed. In battle, the tactical commander has an inherent responsibility to his soldiers, severally and collectively, to meet their expectations. The pervasive attitude that victory will be achieved is an essential pillar of morale. This **command contract** is a quality not written or easily observed. It binds the general to his subordinates through perceptions, in that soldiers must be convinced their lives are not being wasted in the face of danger. The reward of victory is only attained through human

sacrifice. The general upholds his part of the agreement through the meticulous planning, preparation, and execution of the battle. Socrates supported this thought by asserting, "the general must know how to get his men their rations and every other kind of stores needed in war. He must have imagination to originate plans, practical sense and energy to carry them through...He should also know his tactics; for a disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building materials a house."²⁸ This quality of command contract also precludes the transformation of will and determination into obstinacy. Obstinacy wastes lives needlessly; the command contract provides flexibility and the insight to change when the situation dictates.

The eight qualities described in the three categories above are essential for competent tactical generals. Cognitive qualities are exemplified when facing an enemy in battle. Temperamental qualities are oriented toward action. Moral qualities are somewhat personal and altruistic in nature. The interdependent balance among these qualities enables tactical generals to attain competence and achieve success in combat. At the tactical level, Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant and Major General Erwin Rommel possessed this delicate balance. An examination of their actions in engagements and battles will help to explain the importance of these qualities.

TACTICAL GENERALSHIP OF GRANT

"The art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike him as hard as you can, and keep moving on." 29


Forts Henry and Donelson were southern strongholds protecting the gateway of the western theater of the Confederacy. Both were located near the Kentucky/Tennessee border, controlling navigation on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers respectively. (Map 1). Strategically, the control of these two forts would decide the fate the border states, Tennessee and Kentucky. They also guarded the railroad lines of communication (LOC) between Bowling Green and Columbus since Memphis and Nashville were not fortified. The line between Columbus and Bowling Green was chosen to bar access to the South by Union forces. The area was also anticipated to be used as a Confederate invasion base to the North. Conversely, if Forts Henry and Donelson fell to the North, an invasion base to the South could be established, and the initiative would be wrested from the Confederacy.

In early January 1862, Grant was ordered to conduct a demonstration into Kentucky. Its purpose was to prevent General A.S. Johnston from sending reinforcements to Bowling Green. BG C.F.A. Smith reported that Ft. Heiman was very vulnerable. Ft. Heiman was a defensive work constructed on the west bank of the Tennessee river. It was positioned on the high ground overlooking Ft. Henry. Ft. Henry, located on the east bank of the river, was constructed on the river bottom, surrounded by hills and within good rifle range. (Map 2). Improvements to both forts began in September 1861; however, no reinforcements were sent by mid-January 1862. Grant's intellect and crea-

KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE

ST. LOUIS

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
MAP 1
WESTERN
THEATER

15a

tivity enabled him to envision a plan to take Ft. Heiman, then use naval gunboats and the high ground surrounding Ft. Henry to secure the position. With Ft. Henry as a base, he could proceed east and seize Ft. Donelson. By doing so, he would accomplish several military aims: 1) He would sever the railroad LOCs between Bolling Green and Columbus, 2) The Union would control the navigation on the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, 3) Kentucky and Tennessee would remain under Union control, 4) A base would be established for an invasion of South, 5) He would instill confidence in his raw, ill-disciplined recruits and volunteers with minor engagements, and 6) He would give the Union a badly needed clear-cut victory.

Grant saw the advantages of attacking Forts Henry and Donelson, but was rebuffed by a very tentative MG H.W. Halleck. With the support of Commodore A.H. Foote, commander of naval forces in the region, Grant again requested permission to execute his plan before the two positions could be reinforced. On 30 January, Halleck sent a letter of instruction to Grant ordering him to seize and hold Ft. Henry. Once Ft. Henry was secured, the railroad between Paris and Dover would be broken by a cavalry force and the bridges rendered impassable. Curiously, there was nothing in the instructions granting permission to attack Ft. Donelson. However, Grant's fortitude and intellect enabled him to see beyond Ft. Henry, with Ft. Donelson as his ultimate objective.

On 2 February, Grant began to move his 17,000 man force up the Tennessee river on transports. BG McClelland commanded the lead division and disembarked eight miles downstream from Ft. Henry. BG Tilghman commanded Forts Henry and Donelson. When the Union fleet and disembarkation were spotted, Tilghman immediately brought reinforce-



MAP 2 FORT HENRY

ments to Ft. Henry from Ft. Donelson. Estimates of 25,000 troops or more were reported at the disembarkation site. Tilghman mustered 2,734 poorly trained and equipped troops at Forts Heiman and Henry. He quickly ascertained that the positions would be overwhelmed by Union forces within two days. Grant made a personal reconnaissance of Ft. Henry on the gunboat Essex, on 4 February. He drew fire from the shore batteries to determine the range of the guns at the fort. He returned to the disembarkation site, re-embarked his troops, and moved them within three miles of Ft. Henry at Bailey's Ferry. Tilghman reasoned that Ft. Donelson was more critical and defensible than Ft. Henry. He abandoned Ft. Heiman, then positioned his forces in breastworks to the east of Ft. Henry and out of the range of the Union gunboats. The troops were to stand by and await orders to retreat to Ft. Donelson under the command of Col. Heiman.

Grant's tactical plan on 6 February was to defeat the forces at Ft. Heiman and hold the high ground overlooking Ft. Henry. A coordinated attack on Ft. Henry by gunboats and ground troops would be conducted in conjunction with overwatching fires from Ft. Heiman. Smith was sent to seize Ft. Heiman with two brigades and found it abandoned. When Grant received word of the abandonment, he knew he had to move quickly to seal Tilghman's force inside Ft. Henry and prevent reinforcements from reaching him. To accomplish this, Grant had to induce an engagement quickly. Since his entire force had not reached Bailey's Ferry, he assumed some risk and commenced the attack at 1100 hours. McClelland was to move east of Ft. Henry and block the road to Ft. Donelson and Dover. Afterwards, he would prepare to seize the fort. Heavy rains, dense forests, high water, and the lack of roads impeded troop movement. Commodore Foote was waiting with seven gunboats. He paused until 1230 hours to allow the

ground forces to get into position. For 90 minutes the gunboats engaged the stubborn shore batteries in Ft. Henry. By 1400, all but four guns had been disabled and Tilghman surrendered to Foote. At 1440, the ground troops made their first appearance. The cavalry began to pursue Col. Heiman's retreat and Ft. Henry was secured.

Even though this engagement could be considered a naval victory, the synchronization of naval firepower and ground maneuver cannot be overlooked. The appearance of both elements significantly affected Tilghman's confidence in his poorly equipped force. Additionally, his deficient coup d'oeil contributed to his failure to reason properly through the overestimates of Union forces. These factors led to the rapid collapse of Ft. Henry. Had Tilghman reinforced Ft. Heiman, held the breastworks of Ft. Henry, and dictated the terms of the engagement, Grant would have paid a heavy price to secure Ft. Henry. Grant, on the other hand, assumed the initiative and managed to defeat Tilghman with naval firepower and the movement of his ground forces. On 6 February, he sent a telegram to Halleck stating, "Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. I shall take and destroy Ft. Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry."³⁰

Grant did not waste time to celebrate. Ft. Donelson was his final objective. His confidence was enhanced and now he had the opportunity to penetrate the mind of an opposing commander whom he had known from the Mexican War. Grant's assessment of his situation and the enemy was sent in a letter to his sister on 9 February:

"You have no conception of the amount of labor I have to perform. An army of men all helpless, looking to the commanding officer for every supply. Your plain brother, however, has as yet no reason to feel himself unequal to the task...I do not speak boastfully, but utter a presentiment. The scare and fright of the rebels up here are beyond conception...C.J. Pillow commands Ft. Donelson. I hope to give him a tug before you receive this." 31

Ft. Donelson, one of the strongest positions established in the western theater, was built on the west side of the Cumberland river eleven mile east of Ft. Henry. It was protected by Hickman Creek in the north, the Cumberland river in the east, Indian Creek and the town of Dover in the south. The only viable tactical approach to the position was from the west.(Map 3). The rapidly rising waters from the Tennessee river prevented an effective pursuit of Col. Heiman on 8 February. Grant conducted a personal reconnaissance of Ft. Donelson with his cavalry. They skirmished with pickets and drove them back into the breastworks surrounding the fort. This action dissuaded any counterattack attempt to retake Ft. Henry or disruption of Grant's movement toward Ft. Donelson. On 10 February, Halleck instructed Grant to fortify Ft. Henry and promised that reinforcements would be sent with entrenching tools. The first group of reinforcements arrived on 12 February. Grant then began his movement toward Ft. Donelson with 15,000 troops while leaving 2,500 at Ft. Henry with BG Lew Wallace.

In the meantime, Gen. Johnston was able to reinforce Ft. Donelson with approximately 18-21,000 troops under the command of BG Floyd. Grant's tactical plan was to surround Ft. Donelson with Smith's division on the left and McClernand's division on the right. Grant used his perceptions of Floyd and Pillow and audaciously surrounded 21,000 entrenched troops with 15,000 unprotected recruits. He justified his boldness by explaining,

"I had known General Pillow in Mexico, and judged that with my force, no matter how small, I could march up to within gunshot of any entrenchments he was given to hold...I knew that Floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and I judged that he would yield to Pillow's pretensions." 32

Grant gave explicit instructions to his commanders to avoid



MAP 3 FORT DONELSON

engagements. He wanted to synchronize his maneuver and fire support element to achieve the synergism of all his combat power on Ft. Donelson. Once Ft. Donelson was surrounded, Commodore Foote was tasked to bombard the position as he did at Ft. Henry.

McClerland found that his appointed position extended his line too much. He could not adequately defend his position without sufficient reserves. Grant resolved this dilemma on 14 February when Foote brought reinforcements, with BG Lew Wallace, from Ft. Henry. These reinforcements were organized into a new division under the command of Wallace. Wallace was placed in the center, which allowed McClerland to shift farther to the right and seal the road leading to Dover.

Pillow developed a false sense of success and feel for the exact disposition of Union forces after two events. On 13 February McClerland became overzealous, attempting to silence a troublesome gun battery on the high ground in front of his position. His impudence cost him over 250 men killed and wounded, plus the loss of a brigade commander. Foote's ironclads were mauled on 14 February when he attempted to bombard Ft. Donelson. Having won these brief engagements Floyd and Pillow planned a breakout to retreat toward Nashville along Wynn's Ferry road. The attack commenced at dawn on 15 February. The plan worked well. McClerland's division fought well, but broke when ammunition stocks were depleted. The right side of Wallace's division received the brunt of the assault. The flight of McClerland's division passed through the ranks of Wallace's right flank. The road to Nashville was open. Pillow began to celebrate by thinking he had routed Grant's entire army. He then withdrew back into Ft. Donelson to conduct a night retreat over the ground he had just gained.

Grant visited Commodore Foote at 0200 on 15 February. Foote had been injured on the 14th and requested permission to return to Cairo to repair his fleet. Grant agreed and was informed of the disastrous news upon his return to his headquarters. He instructed Smith to be prepared to conduct an assault. He then rode to the right and saw the remnants of McClernand's disorganized units mixed with Wallace's forces. After his conversation with McClernand and Wallace, his fortitude and coup d'oeil were manifested when he assessed that Floyd and Pillow were planning to retreat and had no desire to stay and fight.

"It cannot be doubted that he saw with painful distinctiveness the effect of the disaster to his right wing. His face flushed slightly...But in an instant these signs of disappointment or hesitation...cleared away. In his ordinary quiet voice, he said...'Gentleman, the position on the right must be retaken'." 33

Grant took his commanders and staff to reorganize and rally McClernand's division. He instilled new courage in his troops and focussed his intent on the forces inside Ft. Donelson. To regain the initiative, Smith was ordered to commence his attack. Smith's assault drove the weakened left flank out of the breastworks and into the confines of Ft. Donelson. McClernand counterattacked and regained control of Wynn's Ferry road. Grant requested Commodore Foote to conduct a demonstration with his gunboats. The synergism of all these actions resulted in a significant reversal of events. Floyd and Pillow thought their situation was hopeless. A war council was called the night of 15 February to discuss further resistance. Floyd eventually relinquished his command to Pillow, who subsequently passed it to BG Buckner. On 16 February, Buckner considered his situation and sent a letter to Grant proposing an armistice. Grant's

reply was, "Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." ³⁴ Buckner surrendered with 65 guns and 12-15,000 men.

With victory at Ft. Donelson, the military aims of the campaign had been accomplished. This was possible because of Grant's astute application of the art of tactical generalship. He coordinated maneuver and fire support assets very effectively. He never allowed himself to be distracted from the defeat and destruction of Confederate forces in Forts Henry and Donelson. Conversely, his Confederate counterparts never sought a decisive engagement with Grant's entire army. Pillow must be faulted primarily for not fully exploiting his successes on the morning of 15 February. Grant's forces used superb tactics and techniques, especially at Ft. Donelson on 15 February. During the ninety minute engagement at Ft. Henry and the 3 day battle at Ft. Donelson, Grant defeated Tilghman, Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner mentally and physically. In doing so, he manifested all eight qualities of tactical generalship. The interdependence of these qualities was illuminated by his superior intellect and fortitude. His courage and fitness to conduct personal reconnaissance in harsh weather, terrain, and under hostile fire were remarkable. He displayed his coup d'oeil and presence of mind at Ft. Donelson by reorganizing his right flank and striking the vulnerable point of the defense. His boldness and creativity were evident when he counterattacked at Ft. Donelson, using gunboats to support ground maneuver. Finally, he fulfilled the expectations of his soldiers by seizing two strongholds and suffering fewer than 4,000 casualties. The Confederates lost almost the same number; however, Grant captured 15,000 prisoners and 80 guns.

TACTICAL GENERALSHIP OF ROMMEL

"This is the age of Seydlitz and Ziethen all over again. We've got to look at this war like a cavalry action- we've got to throw in tank divisions like cavalry squadrons, and that means issuing orders from the moving tank, just as generals once used to from the saddle." 35

Like Grant, MG Erwin Rommel entered World War II with previous war experience. Although the nature of land warfare had changed, from gunboat and land maneuver to air and mechanized maneuver, the application and qualities of tactical generalship remained constant. Many historians will describe Rommel's actions during this period as unorthodox boldness and phenomenal luck. A thorough examination of his actions within the context of the application and qualities of tactical generalship will show that he had complete tactical command of the battlefield.

Rommel assumed command of the 7th Panzer Division on 15 February 1940. The division's unique organization differed from other Panzer

D I V H Q --- <u>Gefechtsstaffel</u> (TAC CP)				
RECCE	ARMOR	INFANTRY (motorized)	ENGRS	ARTY
37 Recce Bn; Armor cars and motorcycles	25th Panzer Regt. (3 Tank Bns; 218 Tks)	6th Rifle Regt. (3 Bns)	58th Pioneer Bn.	
		7th Rifle Regt. (2 Bns)		78th ARTY Regt (3 Bns; 36 x 105mm guns)
		7th Motorcycle Bn.		42d AT ARTY Bn (54 x 37mm guns)

Table 1.

divisions because it had one tank regiment with three battalions, instead of the normal two tank regiments with two battalions. Conse-

quently, the division comprised a total of 218 tanks in comparison with other Panzer divisions with up to 320 tanks. For 2 1/2 months, Rommel inundated himself with the theory and practice of tank warfare. Deep penetrations were second nature to him since he had practiced these same techniques as an infantryman in World War I. He recognized the potential of tanks to advance deep into the enemy's rear, throw him off balance, and exploit through pursuit. His saw disruption and confusion as the key to tactical success with mechanized forces. His intellect determined that speed, prompt opening fires, and the synergism of combined arms spared lives and achieved rapid tactical success.

On 10 May 1940, the German offensive into Belgium and France commenced. The 7th Division crossed the Belgian border about 30 miles south of Liege. (Map 4). The division was part of Hoth's XV Corps, which also had the 5th Panzer Division. The corps was the armored spearhead of Von Kluge's 4th Army. Rommel was flanked on the right by the 5th Panzer Division and on the left by Heinz Guderian's XIX Corps. Rommel's unorthodox style surfaced immediately when he rode at the tip of his schwerpunkt (main effort). He was a fighting and thinking general who sought his objective with dogged determination and will. His subordinates observed that he was "...a paroxysm of movement and excitement...a man possessed, sustained almost to addiction by the adrenaline of war. There is no time for introspection, little for logistics, hardly a moment in which to consider the foibles or faults of other people- friend or foe." ³⁶ Rommel and Guderian complemented one another magnificently. At times it seemed as if Rommel bore an obsession to beat Guderian to the coast of France.

Rommel reached Dinant and the Meuse river on 12 May after brushing through light French resistance. He used his creativity to teach his subordinates how to maintain the initiative when taken under fire. He employed disruptive tactics and techniques to exploit the flaws he found in French fighting techniques.

"At our first clash with French mechanised forces, prompt opening fire on our part led to a hasty French retreat...the day goes to the side that is the first to plaster its opponent with fire. The man who lies low and awaits developments usually comes off second best. Motorcyclists at the head of column keep their machine-guns at the ready and open fire the instant an enemy shot is heard. This applies even when the exact position of the enemy is unknown...Observation of this rule...substantially reduces one's own casualties. It is fundamentally wrong simply to halt and look for cover without opening fire...in tank attacks...the action of opening fire immediately into the area which the enemy is believed to be holding, instead of waiting until several of one's own tanks have been hit, usually decides the issue." 37


At times he would leave his Gefechtstaffel (mobile command and signal vehicles) to assume personal command of his lead battalion. At the Meuse, he was seen waist deep in the river, shifting baulks of timber to construct a bridge. These and other incidents filtered through the entire division, which instilled a passion in his soldiers to strive beyond the limits of physical exertion. By nightfall on 13 May, despite determined French resistance and using bridging material furtively taken from the 5th Panzer Division, Rommel crossed the Meuse and established a valuable bridgehead. As a result of his rapid crossing of the Meuse river and unorthodox style of tactical generalship, Rommel had essentially penetrated and defeated the minds of every French general in his path, beginning with General Corap. In the next month he would mastermind a phenomenal string of engagements that would contribute significantly to the disruption and destruction of the French and British defenses in France.

On 16 May he received orders to breach the Maginot Line through Sivry and secure the high ground around Avesnes. Rommel rode in Col. von Bismarck's (Cdr., 25th Tank Regt) tank to lead the attack. After he conducted an unprecedented penetration and pursuit through a heavily fortified zone around Clairfayts, he secured Avesnes with two battalions on 17 May. The rest of his division was strung out between Avesnes and Phillippeville. French units and refugees were intermingled amongst his units. Despite the chaos, he incessantly pushed his lead elements towards Landrecies to seize crossings over the Sambre river. He halted just east of LeCateau at 0615 on 17 May. His 50 mile tank advance in a 24-hour period was a classic tactical operation, exemplifying creativity, boldness, and superior coup d'oeil. The Maginot Line had been ruptured in magnificent fashion. The speed of Rommel's advance prevented the French from conducting an effective counterattack and led to the complete disorganization and eventual disintegration of their defensive cohesion.


Rommel remained at LeCateau long enough to rearm and refuel. Before all of his battalions were resupplied, he was far ahead with one battalion racing toward Cambrai. Once Cambrai was taken, he decided to reorganize, resupply, and rest his division. A pattern was beginning to evolve within the division- press the enemy nonstop for 4-6 days, pause to reorganize and resupply, then press nonstop for 4-6 more days. His theories on speed, massing of maximum available firepower at decisive points, and being at the head of his columns were proving to be very effective.

These incessant rushes created problems not only for the French but also for Rommel's own subordinates. At times it appeared his actions were sheer recklessness more than calculated risks. A chief complaint was registered by his staff, who many times had to sustain

MAP 4



Panzer advance to the sea 1940



MAP 5

and monitor engagements without communications with Rommel. They were not accustomed to his leadership style and were generally the last to know his intentions. Rommel spent most of his time at the head of his column, interfacing directly with his commanders, and was prone to assume personal command of the lead battalion. His remarkable coup d'oeil and presence of mind enabled him to assume these risks and be successful. His sense and instinct for battle was unmatched. He completely understood his role within the armored spearhead of the Army and performed beyond the expectations of his higher commanders.

Rommel was allowed to continue his advance toward Arras on 20 May. He nearly suffered his first major setback around Arras on 21 May. He engaged the British for the first time in his career and discovered that they were better trained and equipped than the French. The division was advancing around the southwest flank of Arras and moving toward Lille via Acq. (Map 5). The British with superior tanks (Matildas) counterattacked with two tank regiments (4th & 7th RTRs) from the 50th Division. They drove through Arras and cut into the flanks of the 6th and 7th Rifle Regiments. The 37mm antitank guns were inadequate against the heavily armored Matildas and were quickly overrun. Rommel overestimated the size of the counterattack force when he reported to higher headquarters, but maintained his presence of mind by directing all fires towards the British tanks. The 6th Regiment was annihilated while the 7th Regiment remained heavily engaged around Vailly. Fortunately, the artillery and anti-aircraft guns had established positions around Ficheux, Mercatel, and Neuville Vitasse. The right wing of the British became disoriented and the left wing deployed into the open country at Beaurains. During this engagement, the 88mm anti-aircraft guns proved to

be effective antitank weapons. The crews of the 105mm and 88mm guns held their ground and stopped the assault.


The 25th Panzer Regiment was recalled from Acq and drove into an antitank ambush at Agnez. The regiment lost 30 tanks before the British withdrew. The lack of infantry, artillery, and air support forced the British to break contact and withdraw toward Lille. The failure of an adequate reconnaissance effort taught Rommel a valuable lesson. In that one engagement, his division suffered four times the total number of its losses up to that time. Afterwards, the division was more prudent and deliberate when fighting a more determined British force. It advanced just southwest of Lille and was menacing enough to contain British and French forces in that area. This allowed Guderian to sweep the right flank of the 7th Division and seize Calais. Once the British withdrew to Dunkirk, the 7th Division was ordered out of the action to rest at Arras.

The six days' rest allowed the division to repair and refit its equipment. Rommel wisely used this time to prepare for the final phase of the offensive. He improved the coordination among his staff and had the opportunity to discuss the previous month's action with all of his officers. They learned some valuable lessons and resolved never to be surprised again as they had been at Arras.

Rommel's reputation for speed and disruption was well established. Hitler chose to capitalize on Rommel's tactical abilities by instructing him to get to Cherbourg as fast as possible. His role was to secure Cherbourg before an armistice could be signed. In doing so, he would trap remnants of the British and French armies and prevent their embarkation to Great Britain. With these orders, Rommel clearly understood that he could not be delayed or become decisively engaged with minor forces.

The final offensive began with the crossing of the Somme river on 5 June. (Map 6). He captured and secured four bridges and penetrated the French defenses on 6 June. His intellect and creativity helped him to devise an alternative to using the road networks where French strongpoint defenses were established. Rommel contrived a tactical formation termed "...the Flachenmarsch, or 'formation drive' in which the entire panzer division steamrolled across the open, undulating countryside in a box formation. A tank battalion formed the front and the sides, while the rear was brought up by the antitank and reconnaissance battalions. The rifle regiments filled the center of the box, their wheeled transport following the tracks..."³⁸ This formation reduced dispersal, provided all around security, and improved command, control, and communications within the division.

Between 7 and 8 June, he raced seventy-five miles cross-country toward Elbeuf to secure crossings over the Seine river. Since the bridges were blown, he received orders to capture LeHavre and cut off the escape of three British and French infantry divisions. A captured French civilian indicated that there was very little British activity in LeHavre. At the same time Rommel received a message that an Allied motorized column was moving out of St. Saen towards Yvetot. Rommel changed his direction and sent his reconnaissance battalion to Veulette. He then closed the St. Saen-Yvetot road with elements of the reconnaissance battalion and anti-aircraft batteries. He intercepted the lead elements of the 31st French Division on the Cany-Fecamp road and later seized Les Petites' Dallas on the coast. His reconnaissance battalion continued to Fecamp, sealed the remainder of the 31st Division until the 25th Regiment arrived to secure the Fecamp-St. Leonard road.




MAP 6 THE SOMME-SEINE BREAK-THROUGH

Upon learning of a large British and French embarkation operation at St. Valery, Rommel gained control of the hills and high ground surrounding the port. His tanks closed the roads and egress routes to the city. When the city refused to surrender, Rommel coordinated the bombardment of the city with his elements and the Luftwaffe. Heavy sparring between German antitank guns, artillery, and British warships in the harbor continued through the morning of 12 June. By 1600, the city could no longer resist. General Ihler, the French IX Corps commander, capitulated.

By now, the 7th Panzer Division was nicknamed "Ghost Division" because of its knack of appearing where least expected. With Cherbourg still an issue, Rommel deployed the division back to Evreux, just south of the Seine river. Since the French were expecting him to race along the coastline, Rommel decided to pursue the indirect approach and rolled 100 miles cross-country to Argentan on 16 June. On 17 June, he surpassed any previous day's advance in the history of warfare by dashing 220 miles from Argentan to Coutances. The next day he turned north along the west coast route, and began his assault on Cherbourg from the southwest. (Map 7).

French resistance became more obstinate on the approach to Cherbourg. Rommel was forced to clear obstacles at St. Sauver-de-Pierre Pont and drove through artillery and machine gun fire northeast of St. Lo d'Ourville. The division closed on Sotteville during the night of 18 June. Preparations began for the assault on Cherbourg. Using captured French maps, Rommel amended his original order and launched his attack around the western end of Querqueville. Rather than assault Cherbourg directly, he chose the high ground overlooking the port section of Cherbourg as his initial objective. As he did at



MAP 7

THE DRIVE INTO CHERBOURG

St. Valery, he coordinated the bombardment of Cherbourg with his artillery and the Luftwaffe. Through the morning of 19 June, he concentrated on the surrounding forts protecting Cherbourg. One by one each fort capitulated. Finally, at 1700 on 19 June, the Cherbourg garrison surrendered. One of the most spectacular tactical operations of history was completed.

Between 10 May and 19 June, the "Ghost Division's" casualties amounted to 682 killed, 1646 wounded, 225 missing, and 42 tanks lost. The division rambled over 400 miles and captured 5 admirals, 1 Corps commander, 4 division commanders, 458 tanks and armored cars, 277 artillery pieces, and 97,468 prisoners. Because of the chaos and confusion created by the division, it was difficult to ascertain an accurate count of Allied dead and wounded.

Many have argued that Rommel's tactics were reckless, venturesome, and cloaked with astounding luck. Regardless, his achievements in six weeks of combat could have been accomplished only by a commander who was tactically adept and maximized his generalship qualities. He was innovative and created his own tactical techniques which fit his scheme of maneuver. For instance, his policy on opening fires when initially engaged was revolutionary. It exhausted large quantities of ammunition but saved lives. Firing in all directions while moving was a technique which complemented rapid penetrations. He always anticipated his next objective. This enhanced his movement and prevented the French from organizing an effective defense or counterattack against him. He epitomized the art of tactical generalship by destroying enemy forces when the situation dictated, bypassing enemy forces to disrupt them, and maintaining a cohesive unit on a chaotic nonlinear battlefield. This was particularly evident

during the final offensive phase.

His courage, fitness, and fortitude were the electrical impulses which drove his men beyond the thresholds of exertion. His soldiers accepted his challenges and attained military goals never before achieved. Rommel's intellect and coup d'oeil enabled him to sense weaknesses in the French capabilities to defend. His deep penetrations consistently disrupted the cohesiveness of the enemy; the cumulative effects eventually led to the rapid disintegration of the French army. The creativity and boldness he possessed made swift armored warfare second nature to him. More than any other divisional commander, he understood the practical application of blitzkrieg. He magnificently devised and executed principles and tactics to conduct it. Through agile maneuver, synchronized ground and air power, and resolute initiative, he was able to disorganize a confused enemy. Rommel did make mistakes. However, he quickly learned from his mistakes and made appropriate adjustments without delay. Finally, like Grant, he fulfilled the expectations of his soldiers. He challenged them continuously and achieved resounding victories with minimal casualties. Enlightened by the qualities of tactical generalship, both men created their own rules of maneuver which can be emulated in the future.

CONCLUSION
WHY UNDERSTANDING THE ESSENCE AND QUALITIES OF TACTICAL GENERALSHIP
IN THE 21ST CENTURY IS IMPORTANT

"There is need for carefully developed educational programs to foster the understanding and transfer of ideas between the many specialized institutions and professionals now concerned with preparation for war." 39

The evolution of warfare and armies over the past three centuries can offer some clues to the true nature of future warfare. In the eighteenth century, winning battles or seizing terrain usually decided wars. Nineteenth century warfare concentrated on the destruction of enemy armies by means of the climatic or decisive battle. To settle global wars and destroy armies, twentieth century warfare required simultaneous and/or successive engagements and battles. From the US perspective, warfare in the 21st century will fluctuate along the spectrum of low, mid, and high intensity conflicts. The exact nature of the conflict will depend on the perspective of combatants. For these reasons, 21st century warfare will place higher demands on tactical generals than in past wars. They must be totally prepared to fight with current and available resources and not futuristic research and development systems. Furthermore, the uncertainties of war will be more complex than before.

A fair conjecture of the characteristics of future wars can be drawn from Trevor Dupuy's chart.(Table 2). He contrasts the increases in weapons lethality with the conspicuous expansion of troop dispersal on the battlefield. The ages of muscle and gunpowder indicate a constant relationship between weapon lethality and troop dispersal. However, the effects of industrialization and technology in the twentieth century significantly enlarged the battlefield and the need for dispersal. Today, armored and mechanized

weapon systems are faster, technically specialized, more numerous and more lethal than in the past. Naval, air, artillery, intelligence, communications and other combat support and service support systems have enhanced the sophistication, scope, and intensity of modern war.

In addition to these systems, the potential introduction of tactical nuclear and chemical weapons will prompt radical and innovative changes in maneuver and the application of combat power. The deployment of these weapons by the tactical general must support the concept of operations and at the same time afford a negligible risk to friendly forces. On the other hand, the tactical general must consider protection from the enemy's use of these weapons and subsequent actions after the enemy employs these weapons. The tactical general with coup d'oeil and fortitude will anticipate and prepare his operations for this eventuality.

Modern combat, combat support, and service support systems create a need for diverse and specialized skills. The infusion of computers has contributed materially to this phenomenon. These very technical and specialized systems will bring unique skills and force structures to the future battlefield. Brigades and divisions will assume specific roles and functions within theaters and zones of operations. The success or failure of these tactical roles and functions could lead to the success or failure of a campaign. Grant and Rommel understood their roles and applied the art of tactical generalship to attain the military aims of campaigns.

The challenge of the tactical general is threefold. First, he must understand the type and nature of war he is fighting. This includes knowing the enemy as well as the military aims of the opera-

tion. Secondly, he must be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of modern weapon systems. Furthermore, he has to be able to synchronize their employment and movement on the battlefield. Lastly and simultaneously, he must destroy, defeat or disrupt enemy forces which may have equal or better capabilities than his unit. Rommel faced this dilemma in 1940, when the British and French possessed tanks with better protection and firepower than Germany. Still, Rommel created viable alternatives which capitalized on other weaknesses to neutralize the strengths of the Allies. Future tactical generals will also face this problem and will have to be more creative than Rommel.

In the 21st century, the synchronization of modern weapon systems, specialized force structures, and the employment of tactical nuclear weapons could very well change the nature of battle. Engagements in mid and high intensity wars could become anachronisms, whereas battles could be decided in hours. The tactical general who can best comprehend the nature of the conflict, the norms of the enemy, and capabilities of his weapon systems, can adequately apply the art of tactical generalship. "Success is only to be obtained by simultaneous efforts, directed upon a given point, sustained with constancy, executed with decision."⁴¹ The tactical generals who sufficiently practice this art will have the most impact on the nature of future warfare.

The need to know and understand the essence and qualities of tactical generalship is extremely important. Because of the nebulous nature of future wars, tactical generals must be prepared to fight a conflict within the low, mid, and high intensity spectrum. Grant and Rommel were able to adapt very quickly to the changing nature of war-

fare. Even though they had different leadership styles, the one attribute they had in common was sound tactical generalship.

Generalship is primarily an art. It is the application of knowledge, experience, and study in the conduct of war. The essence of tactical generalship is based on a foundation of inherent qualities rather than a set of principles and skills. Leadership relates to specific skills or abilities based on logical principles and attributes. These abilities differ in every individual because personality has a major impact on a general's leadership style. Personality does not effect the inherent qualities of an individual. For this reason, two generals can have different leadership styles and still practice sound tactical generalship. General officers should be aware of the distinction between generalship and leadership as they study the significance of their office and rank in the conduct of battles and engagements.

Understanding the attitudinal and mental metamorphosis from peacetime to war is vital. The means to restore peace, for the tactical general, is through the destruction and defeat of the enemy's army. The general executes these means through the prosecution of engagements and battles. The qualities of tactical generalship enable the commander to transition from peace to war, comprehend his role on the battlefield, and accomplish his missions with minimal loss of life.

The cognitive qualities enabled Grant and Rommel to wade through mundane tasks or minute details. They were rarely distracted from the main focus of their operations. Using their astute intellects, creativity, and coup d'oeil, they were able to design operations based on their feel for the enemy's disposition and situation. The

temperamental qualities spurred the cognitive qualities to action. Both men displayed impeccable courage by placing themselves close to the front. They applied tactics and techniques designed to hit the enemy rapidly before he could react. Their stalwart natures contributed immeasurably to their success. Bold actions not only led to the disruption and destruction of enemy units but enhanced the economy of life. The safety and preservation of life are the rudiments of the moral domain qualities.

None of the qualities of tactical generalship are exclusive. They must be mutually dependent to achieve success in combat. Grant and Rommel possessed this interdependence among the eight qualities. Their successes were directly influenced by this interdependence. The teaching and study process for tactical generalship should begin in the senior staff college where senior level leadership is first taught. It should be reinforced later at the senior service and general officer schools. The teaching of tactical generalship can be integrated with current leadership training. Senior officers should be as aware of the qualities of tactical generalship as they are of leadership skills and attributes. In doing so, future leaders will be thoroughly cognizant of the differences between leadership and generalship, as well as understand the influence generalship can have on leadership.

Tactical generalship can trigger the leadership responses from subordinate commanders to train, maneuver, and concentrate the firepower of many combat, combat support, and service support systems at decisive points. General officers must continually study and discuss the art of their rank and office. Special interest should be devoted to current tactical doctrine and the diverse characteristics of

future conflicts. Successful tactical generals in the 21st century will be the ones, as in the past, who best apply the art of tactical generalship and exemplify the eight qualities. These will be the generals who will produce victories on the nuclear, chemical, or conventional battlefield.

ENDNOTES

1. John Laffin, Links of Leadership, (New York: Abeland-Schuman, LTD., 1970), p. 243.
2. Webster Third New World International Dictionary of the English Language, (Springfield, Ma.: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961), p. 945.
3. Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 105-106.
4. American Heritage Dictionary, 2d ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982), p. 552.
5. Barbara Tuchman, "Generalship," Parameters, No. 2-2, 1972, p. 3.
6. James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War: A Comprehensive Guide to Modern Warfare, (New York: Quill, 1982), pp. 216, 217, 222. [] author insertion.
7. Sir Archibald Wavell, Generals and Generalship: The Lee Knowles Lectures Delivered at Trinity College, Cambridge in 1939, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: The Art of War Colloquium, US Army War College, 1983), p. 26.
8. J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of U.S. Grant, 2d ed. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1958), p. 9.
9. The purpose of this study is to examine the qualities of tactical generalship. Strategic and operational generalship differ from tactical generalship in that the scope of operations at those levels are much broader than the tactical level. Each level of generalship has the eight qualities discussed in this study, however, the variations of those qualities differ at each level. For example, the operational general conducts campaigns and major operations. His chief responsibility is to ensure that his campaign achieves strategic goals. Consequently, he does not have to display the same personal courage as the tactical general. He does not have to lead formations or place himself in constant danger. His appearance at critical moments or decisive points will stimulate morale, but he still has to keep maintain his focus on the campaign and not tactical objectives.
10. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p.78.
11. Technical Manual (TM) 20-205, Dictionary of US Army Terms, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1944), p. 277.
12. Clausewitz, pp. 227, 231.
13. Clausewitz, pp. 233-234.
14. Clausewitz, p. 262.

15. Maj. Mitchell Zais describes these categories as abilities in his MMAS thesis, Generalship and the Art of Senior Command: Historical and Scientific Perspectives, dated May 1985, unpublished. This study focuses on leadership and attempts to tie generalship to senior level leadership. The purpose of this study is to focus specifically on tactical generalship and to examine this entity as an art. The cognitive, temperamental, and moral domain qualities are somewhat similar to the attributes described by Zais. The difference in our views is the distinction between qualities and abilities. Qualities are inherent attributes of character, whereas abilities relate to skill and talent. Abilities can rely on principles and qualities, however, qualities are developed and ingrained with years of experience and study.

16. Clausewitz, p. 101.

17. Laffin, p. 28.

18. Maurice de Saxe, Reveries of the Art of War, trans. and ed. Thomas R. Phillips (Harrisburg, Pa.: Military Service Publishing Co., 1944), p. 117.

19. A.H. Jomini, The Art of War, trans. G.H. Mendell and W.P. Craighill (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971), p. 89.

20. J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Their Cure, (Harrisburg: Military Service Publishing Co., 1936), p. 32.

21. Clausewitz, p. 102.

22. Clausewitz, p. 101. [], author's insertions.

23. Robert D. Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Naval and Military Quotations, (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1966) p. 130.

24. Heinl, p. 132.

25. Clausewitz, p. 191.

26. Wavell, p. 3.

27. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and Cures, p. 35.

28. Heinl, p. 128.

29. Heinl, p. 132.

30. Adan Badeau, Military History of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. I, (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1885), pp. 32-33.

31. U.S. Grant, Letters of Ulysses S. Grant to His Father and His Sister, 1857-78, ed. Jesse Grant Cramer (New York: Knickerbocker Press, 1912), pp. 81-82.

32. Fuller, The Generalship of U.S. Grant, p. 83.

33. Lew Wallace, "The Capture of Ft. Donelson," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. I (New York: Century Co., 1884), p. 422.

34. U.S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, ed. E.B. Long (New York: World Publishing Co., 1952), p. 159.

35. David Irving, The Trail of the Fox, (New York: Avon, 1978), p. 60.

36. Charles Douglas-Home, Rommel, (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973), 52.

37. Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers, ed. B.H. Liddell Hart, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1953), p. 7.

38. Irving, p. 64.

39. Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1984), p. 341.

40. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare, pp. 288-289.

41. Heinl, p. 130.

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